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Abstract
This paper develops an open-economy DSGE model to analyze the e¤ects of international trade costs on
monetary policy of open economies. The implications of this micro-founded New-Keynesian model are tested
on a prototype small economy that is open to international trade costs shocks, Canada. When a utility-based
expected loss function is considered, the central bank is found to be far from being optimal in its actions,
independent of international trade costs. When an ad hoc expected loss function considering the volatilities in
ination, output and interest rate is considered, it is found that the actions of the central bank are explained best
when international trade costs in fact exist but the central bank ignores them. Given the ad hoc loss function,
the actions of the central bank are best explained when 70% of weight is assigned to ination, 15% of weight to
interest rate and 15% of weight to output.
JEL Classication: E52, E58, F41
Key Words: DSGE Model, Monetary Policy Rule, International Trade Costs, Ination Targeting.
1. Introduction
Research on ination targeting and monetary policy has focused on explaining the actual central bank behavior.1
But, is there a role for international trade costs in explaining this behavior? This paper attempts to answer this
question using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DGSE) with the addition of international trade costs
to an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model of monetary policy. The implications of this micro-founded New-
Keynesian model are tested on a prototype small economy that is open to international trade costs shocks, Canada.
A New-Keynesian Phillips curve, together with the monetary policy rule of the Bank of Canada, is estimated for
the Canadian economy. In order to analyze the e¤ects of international trade costs on monetary policy, versions of
the model are considered, with and without trade cots. It is found that under a utility-based expected loss function
(i.e., the loss function based on the utility of individuals in the economy), the Bank of Canada appears to be far
from optimal in its actions, independent of international trade costs. In contrast, under an ad hoc expected loss
function, the actions of the Bank of Canada are explained best when international trade costs in fact exist, but
the Bank of Canada ignores them. It is also shown that given the ad hoc loss function, the actions of the Bank of
Canada are best explained when 70% of weight is assigned to ination, 15% of weight to interest rate and 15% of
weight to output.
Corresponding Author: Department of Economics, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA; Tel: +1-215-204-8880; Fax:
+1-215-204-8173; e-mail: skuday@gmail.com
1See Taylor (1993, 2000), Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida et al. (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Ball
(1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999), McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001), Walsh (1999), Nelson (2000), Erceg et al. (2000), Svensson
(2000), Dib (2001, 2003), Sutherland (2001), Ghironi and Rebucci (2002), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000, 2002), Parrado and Velasco (2002),
Benigno and Benigno (2003), Devereux and Engel (2003), Laxton and Pesenti (2003), Woodford (2001, 2003), Ambler et al. (2004),
Parrado (2004), Murchison et al. (2004), Christiano et al. (2005), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2005), Huang and
Liu (2005), Yazgan and Yilmazkuday (2007), Yilmazkuday (2007), among many others.
An open economy model is introduced with the home country and the rest of the world. In the model, there are
three sets of agents: individuals, rms, and central bank policy makers. Individuals maximize their intertemporal
lifetime expected utility function consisting of utility obtained from domestic (home) goods and foreign (imported)
goods, together with disutility from supplying labor. The production of goods requires labor input combined with
technology. The model employs a Calvo price-setting process, in which rms are able to change their prices only
with some probability, independent of other rms and the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Firms behave
as monopolistic competitors. Imported nal goods are subject to symmetric international trade costs for both
domestic and foreign individuals. The main nuance of the model is the inclusion of these international trade costs
which is important in terms of its implications on real exchange rates and the Law-of-One-Price.2
The micro-foundations of the individual-rm behavior result in an IS curve and a New-Keynesian Phillips curve,
both functions of international trade costs. While the New-Keynesian Phillips curve takes into account the non-zero
ination target as the steady-state ination (similar to the studies such as Kozicki and Tinsley, 2003; Ascari, 2004;
Cogley and Sbordone, 2006; Amano et al., 2006, 2007; Bakhshi et al., 2007; Sbordone, 2007), the IS curve captures
the e¤ect of international trade costs on output, which is not the usual case in the literature.3 In particular, it
is found that the output decreases with international trade costs. Moreover, an expected increase in international
trade costs has a negative e¤ect on the expected change in output gap, ceteris paribus. For monetary policy rule,
the central bank manages a short-term nominal interest rate according to an open economy variant of the Taylor
rule. Following Yazgan and Yilmazkuday (2007), the monetary policy rule of Taylor (1993) and Clarida et al. (1998,
1999, and 2000) is modied by keeping the ination target in the nal form of the rule.
Another contribution of this paper is the estimation of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, together with the
monetary policy rule, for the Canadian economy, by using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). However,
recently, GMM estimators have been criticized on the grounds that inference based on these estimators is incon-
clusive. The related econometric literature indicates that there has been considerable evidence that asymptotic
normality provides a poor approximation of the sampling distributions of GMM estimators. Particularly, the GMM
estimator becomes heavily biased (in the same direction as the ordinary least squares estimator), and the distri-
bution of the GMM estimator is quite far from the normal distribution (e.g. bimodal). Stock and Wright (2000)
attribute this problem to weak identicationor weak instruments, that is, instruments that are only weakly
correlated with the included endogenous variables. Stock et al. (2002) and Dufour (2003) provide a comprehensive
survey on weak identication in GMM estimation. In this paper, the problem of weak identication is addressed
by using two di¤erent tests. The rst of these tests is the Anderson and Roubin (1949) test (AR-test) in its general
form presented by Kleibergen (2002). The second test is the K -test developed by Kleibergen (2002). These two tests
are robust in the case of nonlinear models (see Dufour, 2003; Stock et al., 2002), and perhaps more importantly,
they are robust even to excluded instruments (see Dufour, 2003). Since it is rarely possible to use all possible
instruments, this latter property is quite important from an applied point of view (see Yazgan and Yilmazkuday,
2005, 2007).
By applying a simulation based on the estimated parameters, optimal monetary policy rules under di¤erent
scenarios are calculated through simulations. In particular, following the lead of Ambler et al. (2004), Cayen
et al. (2006), Murchison and Rennison (2006), Ortega and Rebei (2006), which give insights about the Bank
of Canadas policy-analysis models, the method of stochastic simulations is employed to determine the vector of
monetary policy rule parameters that minimizes the expected loss function, given the dynamics of the Canadian
economy (i.e., the IS curve and the estimated New-Keynesian Phillips curve).4 Following Woodford (2003), rst, a
utility-based expected loss function is considered, and it is shown that the Bank of Canada is far from being optimal
2See Alessandria (2004), Caves et al. (1990), Crucini et al. (2005), Engel (1983), Engel and Rogers (1996), Krugman and Obstfeld
(1991), Lutz (2004), Parsley and Wei (2000), Rogers and Jenkins (1995). Also see Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) who show that trade cost
may be important in explaining the six major puzzles in international macroeconomics.
3See McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001), Walsh (2003), Woodford (2003), Parrado (2004), Gali and Monacelli (2005), Yilmazkuday
(2007), Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), among many others, that consider foreign output levels in the IS curve instead of trade costs.
4Also see Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (1999), Erceg et al. (1998, 2000) as other studies on optimized monetary policy rules.
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in such a case, independent of international trade costs. Then, an ad hoc expected loss function is employed, and
the calculated optimal monetary rules are compared with the estimated monetary policy rule to obtain the weights
assigned to ination, output and interest rate volatilities, at which the percentage deviation of the expected loss
from its optimal value takes its minimum value. An optimistic approach is followed, and these calculated weights
are accepted as the Bank of Canadas policy weights. Thus, instead of assigning ad hoc weights to the mentioned
variables in the loss function, they are calculated by simulation techniques.5 The simulation results show that the
actions of the Bank of Canada are best explained when international trade costs actually exist but the Bank of
Canada ignores them.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a New-Keynesian model and illustrates a
modied specication of monetary policy developed to take into account the ination targets. Section 3 presents
the main estimation results. Section 4 depicts the results and comparisons of the simulation based on the Canadian
economy. Section 5 concludes. The model solution is given in the Appendix.
2. The Model
A continuum of goods model is introduced in which all goods are tradable, the representative individual holds assets,
and the production of goods requires labor input. Subscripts H and F stand for domestically and foreign-produced
goods, respectively. Superscript  stands for the variables of the rest of the world. A bar on a variable ( : ) stands for
a target value. Lower case letters denote log variables. Capital letters without a time subscript denote steady-state
values.
2.1. Individuals
The representative individual in the domestic (i.e., home) country has the following intertemporal lifetime utility
function:
Et
" 1X
k=0
k fU (Ct+k)  V (Nt+k)g
#
(2.1)
where U (Ct) is the utility out of consuming a composite index of Ct, V (Nt) is the disutility out of working Nt
hours, and 0 <  < 1 is a discount factor. The composite consumption index Ct is dened by:
Ct = (CH;t)
1 (CF;t) (2.2)
where CH;t and CF;t are consumption of home and foreign (i.e., imported) goods, respectively, and  is the share
of domestic consumption allocated to imported goods. These symmetric consumption sub-indexes are dened by:
CH;t =
Z 1
0
CH;t(j)
( 1)=dj
=( 1)
and CF;t =
Z 1
0
CF;t(j)
( 1)=dj
=( 1)
(2.3)
where CH;t(j) and CF;t(j) represent domestic consumption of home and foreign good j, respectively, and  > 1 is
the price elasticity of demand faced by each monopolist. The optimality conditions result in:
CH;t(j) =
h
PH;t(j)
PH;t
i 
CH;t
CF;t(j) =
h
PF;t(j)
PF;t
i 
CF;t
(2.4)
where PH;t(j) and PF;t(j) are prices of domestically consumed home and foreign good j, respectively. PH;t and PF;t
are price indexes of domestically consumed home and foreign goods, respectively, which are dened as:
5See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997); Woodford (1999); Batini and Nelson (2001); Smets (2003); Parrado (2004); Yilmazkuday
(2007), among many others, for di¤erent types of loss functions considered in the literature.
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PH;t =
Z 1
0
([PH;t(j)])
1 
dj
1=(1 )
(2.5)
and
PF;t =
Z 1
0
([PF;t(j)])
1 
dj
1=(1 )
(2.6)
Similarly, the demand allocation of home and imported goods implies:
CH;t =
(1  )CtPt
PH;t
(2.7)
and
CF;t =
PtCt
PF;t
(2.8)
where Pt =
 
PH;t
1   
PF;t

is the consumer price index (CPI). The log-linear version of CPI can be written as:
pt  (1  )pH;t + pF;t (2.9)
where pH;t and pF;t are logs of PH;t and PF;t, respectively. The (log) price index for imported goods is further given
by:
pF;t = et + p

F;t +  t (2.10)
where et is the (log) nominal e¤ective exchange rate; pF;t is the (log) price index of domestically consumed foreign
goods at the source; and  t is the (log) gross international trade cost, which is an income received by the rest of
the world.6 The (log) gross international trade cost directly enters the price index for imported goods, because it
is assumed that the international trade costs are the same across goods, and they are symmetric. The evolution of
international trade costs is given by an AR(1) process:
 t =  t 1 + "

t (2.11)
where  2 [0; 1] and "t is assumed to be an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) shock with zero mean
and variance 2 .
7
The (log) e¤ective terms of trade is dened as st  pF;t  pH;t, which implies that the (log) CPI formula can be
written as:
pt  (1  )pH;t + pF;t (2.12)
Combining st  pF;t  pH;t and pF;t = et+ pF;t+  t results in an alternative expression for the (log) e¤ective terms
of trade:
st  et + pF;t +  t   pH;t (2.13)
which includes international trade costs.
6For future reference, pH;t is the (log) price index for the imported goods for the rest of the world, and p

F;t is the (log) domestic price
index for the rest of the world. We assume that the trade costs consist of transportation costs and transportation sector is owned by the
rest of the world, so there is no transportation income received by the home country. This assumption is reasonable after considering
the fact that we are analyzing the ination targeting experience of Canada after the introduction of NAFTA. Another interpretation of
this assumption would be to have iceberg trade costs. See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for a discussion of iceberg melt structure
of economic geography literature and trade costs.
7The introduction of an AR(1) process for the trade costs is essential in our simulations below.
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The formula of CPI ination follows as:
t = H;t +  (st   st 1) (2.14)
where t = pt   pt 1 is CPI ination, and H;t = pH;t   pH;t 1 is the ination of home-produced goods (i.e., home
ination). Combining Equations 2.13 and (2.14) results in an alternative expression of CPI ination:
t = (1  )H;t + 
 
F;t +et + t

(2.15)
which suggests that CPI ination is a weighted sum of home ination, foreign ination, growth in exchange rate, and
growth in international trade costs. Hence, international trade costs play an important role in the determination
of CPI ination.
The individual household constraint is given by:Z 1
0
[PH;t(j)CH;t(j) + PF;t(j)CF;t(j)] dj + Et [Ft;t+1Bt+1] =WtNt +Bt + Tt (2.16)
where Ft;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor, Bt+1 is the nominal payo¤ in period t+1 of the portfolio held at the
end of period t, Wt is the hourly wage, and Tt is the lump sum transfers/taxes.
By using the optimal demand functions, Equation (2.16) can be written in terms of the composite good as
follows:
PtCt + Et [Ft;t+1Bt+1] =WtNt +Bt + Tt (2.17)
The representative home agents problem is to choose paths for consumption, portfolio, and the labor supply. There-
fore, the representative consumer maximizes her expected utility [equation (2.1)] subject to the budget constraint
[equation (2.17)]. By rst order condition implies that:
Et

UC(Ct+1) Pt
UC(Ct) Pt+1

=
1
It
(2.18)
where It = 1/Et [Ft;t+1] is the gross return on the portfolio. Equation (2.18) represents the traditional intertemporal
Euler equation for total real consumption. The labor supply decision of the individual is obtained as follows:
Wt
Pt
=
VN (Nt)
UC (Ct)
(2.19)
The problem is analogous for the rest of the world: Euler equation for the rest of the world is given by:
Et

uC(Ct+1)P

t t
uC(C

t ) P

t+1t+1

= Et [Ft;t+1] (2.20)
where t is the nominal e¤ective exchange rate. Combining Equations (2.18) and (2.20), together with assuming
U(Ct) = logCt, one can obtain:
Ct = C

tQt (2.21)
for all t, where Qt = tP t =Pt is the real e¤ective exchange rate; thus, the (log) e¤ective real exchange rate is
obtained as:
qt = et + p

t   pt (2.22)
By using Equations (2.9), (2.10) and (2.13), together with the symmetric versions of Equations (2.9) and (2.10) for
the rest of the world, we can rewrite Equation (2.22) as follows:
qt = (1     )st   (1  2) t (2.23)
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where  is the share of foreign consumption allocated to goods imported from the home country. In a special case
in which the home country is a small one (i.e.,  is a very small number), Equation (2.23) can be approximated
as:
qt  (1  )st    t (2.24)
Compared to the studies in the literature that ignore international trade costs in open economy models, such as
Parrado (2004), Gali and Monacelli (2005), and Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), the presence of international trade
costs is important in Equations (2.23) and (2.24). In particular, as is shown empirically by Caves et al. (1990),
Crucini et al. (2005), Engel (1983), Engel and Rogers (1996), Krugman and Obstfeld (1991), Lutz (2004), Parsley
and Wei (2000), Rogers and Jenkins (1995), international trade costs play a big role in the determination of real
exchange rates.
Under the assumption of complete international nancial markets, by combining log-linearized version of Equa-
tions (2.18), (2.20) and (2.21), together with Equation (2.22), the uncovered interest parity condition is obtained
as:
it = i

t + Et [et+1]  et (2.25)
where it = log (It) = log (1/ (Et [Ft;t+1])) is the home interest rate and it = log (t/ (Et [Ft;t+1t+1])) is the foreign
interest rate. This uncovered interest parity condition relates the movements of the interest rate di¤erentials to the
expected variations in the e¤ective nominal exchange rate. Since st  et + pF;t +  t   pH;t according to Equation
(2.13), we can rewrite Equation (2.25) as follows:
st =
 
it   Et

F;t+1
   it   Et H;t+1+ Et st+1   t+1 (2.26)
where  t+1 is the change in trade cost from period t to t+ 1. Equation (2.26) shows the terms of trade between
the home country and the rest of the world as a function of current interest rate di¤erentials, expected future home
ination di¤erentials and its own expectation for the next period together with the expected future change in trade
cost. Here, the evolution of foreign interest rate shock is given by:
it = ii

t 1 + "
i
t (2.27)
where i 2 [0; 1], and "i

t is assumed to be an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) shock with zero mean
and variance 2i .
2.2. Firms
The representative domestic rm has the following production function:
Yt (j) = ZtNt (j) (2.28)
where Zt is an exogenous economy-wide productivity parameter; and Nt is labor input. Accordingly, the marginal
cost of production is given by:
MCnt = (1  !)
Wt
Zt
(2.29)
where ! is the employment subsidy. The inclusion of this subsidy is not arbitrary, because as discussed below, under
the assumption of a constant employment subsidy ! that neutralizes the distortion associated with rmsmarket
power, it can be shown that the optimal monetary policy is the one that replicates the exible price equilibrium
allocation in a closed economy.
6
Using Equation (2.19), together with assuming V (Nt) = Nt, the log-linearized real marginal cost can be written
as follows:8
mct = log (1  !) + wt   pH;t   zt (2.30)
Moreover, if the aggregate output in the home country is dened as as Yt =
hR 1
0
Yt(j)
( 1)=dj
i=( 1)
, labor market
equilibrium implies:
Nt =
Z 1
0
Nt(j)dj =
YtAt
Zt
(2.31)
where At =
R 1
0
Yt(j)
Yt
dj of which equilibrium variations can be shown to be of second-order in log terms. Thus, in
rst-order log-linearized terms, we can write:
yt = zt + nt (2.32)
where zt evolves according to:
zt = zzt 1 + "
z
t (2.33)
where z 2 [0; 1] and "zt is assumed to be an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance 2z.
2.3. Market Clearing
For all di¤erentiated goods, market clearing implies:
Yt(j) = CH;t(j) + C

H;t(j) (2.34)
Using Equation (2.4), it can be rewritten as follows:
Yt(j) =

PH;t(j)
PH;t
 
CAH;t (2.35)
where CAH;t = CH;t + C

H;t is the aggregate world demand for the goods produced in the home country. Using
Equation (2.7) and the symmetric version of Equation (2.8) for the rest of the world, Equation (2.35) can be
rewritten as follows:
Yt(j) =

PH;t(j)
PH;t
   
(1  )PtCt
PH;t
+ 
P t C

t
P H;t
!
(2.36)
Using Yt =
hR 1
0
Yt(j)
( 1)=dj
i=( 1)
, one can write:
Yt =

(1  )PtCtPH;t + 
Pt C

t
PH;t

=

Pt
PH;t

Ct

(1  ) + 

Pt PH;t
PtPH;t

Q 1t
 (2.37)
which implies that Equation (2.36) can be rewritten as follows:
Yt(j) =

PH;t(j)
PH;t
 
Yt (2.38)
8Balanced growth requires the relative risk aversion in consumption to be unity, and thus we set U(C) = logC . Following the lead
of Hansen (1985), we also assume that labor is indivisible, implying that the representative agents utility is linear in labor hours so
that V (N) = N .
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Log-linearizing Equation (2.37) around the steady-state, together with using st  pF;t   pH;t and Equation (2.23),
will transform it to the following expression:
yt = ct + st    t (2.39)
Also using Equation (2.14) and the log-linearized version of Equation (2.18) (i.e., Euler), Equation (2.39) can be
rewritten as follows:
yt = Et (yt+1) 
 
it   Et
 
H;t+1

+ Et ( t+1) (2.40)
which represents an IS curve that considers the e¤ect of international trade costs on output, which is not the usual
case in the literature where the last term (i.e., the expected change in international trade costs) is absent. From
another point of view, Equation (2.40) represents an IS curve that relates the expected change in (log) output
(i.e., Et (yt+1)   yt) to the di¤erence between the interest rate, the expected future domestic ination (i.e., an
approximate measure of real interest rate that becomes an exact measure of real interest rate when the terms
of trade are constant across periods), and the expected change in international trade costs.9 An increase in the
di¤erence between the expected ination and the nominal interest rate decreases the expected change in the output
gap, with a unit coe¢ cient. Finally, an expected increase in the international trade costs leads to a decrease in
the expected change in (log) output. The latter is due to the intertemporal substitution of supply in response to a
change in international trade costs.
The model employs a Calvo price-setting process, in which producers are able to change their prices only with
some probability, independently of other producers and the time elapsed since the last adjustment. It is assumed
that producers behave as monopolistic competitors. Accordingly, each producer faces the following demand function:
Yt(j) =

PH;t(j)
PH;t
 
CAH;t; (2.41)
where CAH;t = CH;t + C

H;t is the aggregate world demand for the goods produced. Note that this expression is the
same with Equation (2.35).
Assuming that each producer is free to set a new price at period t, the objective function can be written as:
maxePH;t Et
" 1X
k=0
kFt;t+k
n
Yt+k
 ePH;t  MCnt+ko
#
(2.42)
where ePH;t is the new price chosen in period t, and  is the probability that producers maintain the same price of
the previous period. The problem of producers is to maximize equation (2.42) subject to Equation (2.41). The rst
order necessary condition of the rm for this maximization is:
Et
" 1X
k=0
kFt;t+k
n
Yt+k
 ePH;t   MCnt+ko
#
= 0 (2.43)
where   =(   1) is a markup as a result of market power. Using Equation (2.18), we can rewrite Equation
(2.43) as follows:
Et
" 1X
k=0
()
k Yt+k
Ct+k
PH;t 1
Pt+k
( ePH;t
PH;t 1
  Ht 1;t+kMCt+k
)#
= 0 (2.44)
where Ht 1;t+k =
PH;t+k
PH;t 1
and MCt+k =
MCnt+k
PH;t+k
.
9See Kerr and King (1996), and King (2000) for discussions on incorporating the role for future output gap in the IS curve with a
unit coe¢ cient.
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Log-linearizing equation Equation (2.44) around trend ination  together with balanced trade results in:10
epH;t = '+ pH;t 1 +Et " 1X
k=0
()
k
H;t+k
#
+(1  )Et
" 1X
k=0
()
k cmct+k# (2.45)
where ' = 1   (1  ) and  = log are constants; cmct = mct  mc is the log deviation of real marginal cost
from its steady state value, mc =   log . Equation (2.45) can be rewritten as:
epH;t   pH;t 1 = (1  )'+ Et [epH;t   pH;t 1] + H;t +(1  ) cmct (2.46)
In equilibrium, each producer that chooses a new price in period t will choose the same price and the same level of
output. Then the (aggregate) price of domestic goods will obey:
PH;t =
h
P 1 H;t 1 + (1  ) eP 1 H;t i1=(1 ) (2.47)
which can be log-linearized as follows:
H;t = (1  )
 epH;t   pH;t 1 (2.48)
Finally, by combining Equations (2.46) and (2.48), we obtain the New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
H;t = 0 + Et [H;t+1] + mcmct (2.49)
where  =

1 (1 )() , m =
(1 )(1 )
1 (1 )() , 0 = m', and ' = 1 (1  ). Note that this expression reduces to
a zero-ination steady state New-Keynesian Phillips curve when  = 0 (i.e.,  = 1).
2.4. Equilibrium Dynamics
Combining Equations (2.30) and (2.39) leads to an expression for real marginal cost in terms of output:
mct = log (1  !) + yt   zt +  t (2.50)
By using the symmetric version of Equation (2.39) for the rest of the world, namely yt = c

t + 
st    t, together
with Equations (2.23) and (2.21), one can obtain:
yt = y

t + st    t (2.51)
As discussed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), under the assumption of a constant employment subsidy ! that
neutralizes the distortion associated with rmsmarket power, it can be shown that the optimal monetary policy is
the one that replicates the exible price equilibrium allocation in a closed economy. That policy requires that real
marginal costs (and thus mark-ups) are stabilized at their steady state level, which in turn implies that domestic
prices be fully stabilized. However, as shown by Gali and Monacelli (2005), there is an additional source of distortion
in open economy models: the possibility of inuencing the terms of trade in a way benecial to domestic consumers.
Nevertheless, an employment subsidy can be found that exactly o¤sets the combined e¤ects of market power and
the terms of trade distortions, thus rendering the exible price equilibrium allocation optimal. In order to show
this, consider the optimal allocation from the social planners point of view: maximize Equation (2.1) subject to
Equations (2.28), (2.31), (2.37) and (2.38). This optimization results in a constant level of employment, Nt = 1.
On the other hand, as in Gali and Monacelli (2005), exible price equilibrium satises:
   1

=MCt (2.52)
10For other closed- and open-economy specications with non-zero steady-state ination, see Ascari (2004), Bakhshi et al. (2007),
Cogley and Sbordone (2006), Kozicki and Tinsley (2003), Amano et al. (2006, 2007), Sbordone (2007).
9
where MCt stands for real marginal cost at exible price equilibrium. If Equations (2.19), (2.29), (2.52) are
combined with the optimal allocation of the social planners problem (i.e., Nt = 1), one can obtain:
   1

= 1  ! (2.53)
which suggests that an employment subsidy can be found that exactly o¤sets the combined e¤ects of market power
and the terms of trade distortions.
After dening domestic natural level of output as the one satisfying exible price equilibrium (i.e., Equation
(2.50) with mct =   log ), it can be written as follows:
yt =   log    log (1  !) + zt    t (2.54)
which can be rewritten by using Equation (2.53) as follows:
yt = zt    t (2.55)
which suggests that the domestic natural level of output is negatively a¤ected by international trade costs. This is
mostly due to the allocation of some resources to the international trade costs.
Output gap can be dened as the deviation of (log) domestic output (i.e., yt) from domestic natural level of
output as follows:
xt = yt   yt (2.56)
Using Equation (2.50), one can also write the (log) deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state in terms
of output gap as cmct = xt, which implies that the New-Keynesian Phillips curve can be written in terms of output
gap as follows:
H;t = 0 + Et [H;t+1] + mxt (2.57)
Using Equations (2.40), (2.54) and (2.56), the IS curve can also be written in terms of output gap as follows:
xt = Et (xt+1) 
 
it   Et
 
H;t+1

+ Et (zt+1) (2.58)
Recall Equation (2.40) that represents an IS curve capturing the e¤ects of international trade costs on output.
Similarly, a version of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve capturing the e¤ects of international trade costs can be
written (using Equations (2.55), (2.56), and (2.57)) as follows:
H;t = 0 + Et [H;t+1] + m (yt   zt +  t) (2.59)
Hence, the e¤ects of international trade costs appear in both the IS curve and the New-Keynesian Phillips curve in
the model.
2.5. Monetary Policy
For the monetary policy rule, the central bank manages a short-term nominal interest rate according to the Taylor
rule. Following Taylor (1993) and Clarida et al. (1998, 1999, and 2000), monetary policy rule is given by:
{t = r +  +  [Et (t+1j
t)  ] + xEt (xtj
t) (2.60)
where {t denotes the target rate for nominal interest rate in period t ; is the information set at the time the interest
rate is set; t+1 denotes CPI ination one period ahead;  is the target for CPI ination; xt is the output gap in
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period t ; and r is the long-run equilibrium real rate.11 As in Clarida et al. (2000), it is assumed that the real rate
is stationary and is determined by non-monetary factors in the long run. Since the monthly sample over the period
1996:1 to 2006:12, in which the annual ination target range is exactly the same (i.e., 2%, the midpoint of a control
range of 1% to 3%, according to the Bank of Canada, Macklem, 2002, and Coletti and Murchison, 2002) and the
long-run interest rates are pretty much stable for the Canadian economy, is considered, assuming r and  are time
invariant is realistic.
Similar policy rules to (2.60) have been used in empirical research of several countries. However, most of these
and previously mentioned studies consider a zero ination target over the period of estimation. In this study,
following the lead of Yazgan and Yilmazkuday (2007), the ination target in the monetary policy rule is kept and
Equation (2.60) is modied as follows:
it = r +  +  [t+1   ] + xxt +  t (2.61)
where it is the actual nominal interest rate, and  t =   [t+1   Et (t+1j
t)]   x [xt   Et (xtj
t)] + t. The
term t captures the di¤erence between the desired and the actual nominal interest rate, i.e. t = it {t.12 According
to Clarida et al. (2000), this di¤erence may result from three sources. First, the specication in Equation (2.61)
assumes an adjustment of the actual overnight rates to its target level, and thus ignores, if any, the Bank of Canadas
tendency to smooth changes in interest rates (this issue will be addressed below). Second, it treats all changes in
interest rates over time as reecting the Bank of Canadas systematic response to economic conditions. Specically,
it does not allow for any randomness in policy actions, other than that which is associated with misforecasts of the
economy. Third, it assumes that the Bank of Canada has perfect control over the interest rates, i.e., it succeeds in
keeping them at the desired level (e.g., through open market operations).
Interest rate smoothing is introduced into the model via the following partial adjustment mechanism (see Clarida
et al., 1998, 2000):
it = (1  i){t + iit 1 + vt (2.62)
where i 2 [0; 1] captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. Equation (2.62) postulates that in each period,
the Bank of Canada adjusts the funds rate to eliminate a fraction (1  i) of the gap between its current target
level and its past value. And, t is an independently and identically distributed error term. Substituting Equation
(2.60) into Equation (2.62) yields:
it = (1  i) (r +  +  [t+1   ] + xxt) + iit 1 + "t (2.63)
where "t =   (1  i) f [t+1   Et (t+1j
t)] + x [xt   Et (xtj
t)]g+ t.
Since all the key equations of the model have been introduced, it can be solved as depicted in the Appendix.
3. Estimation
In this section, the monetary policy rule of the Bank of Canada and the New-Keynesian Phillips curve for the
Canadian economy are separately estimated by using continuous updating GMM. The reason for individual GMM
estimations is that joint GMM estimations can be hazardous according to Hayashi (2000, p.273): while a joint
estimation theoretically provides asymptotic e¢ ciency, it may su¤er more from the small-sample bias in practice.
The estimation results will not only help determine how the model explains the Canadian data, but they will also
provide parameters for the simulation analysis.
11 It should be noted that r is an approximate real rate since the forecast horizon for the ination rate will generally di¤er from
the maturity of the short-term nominal rate used as a monetary policy instrument. As noted by Clarida et al. (2000), in practice, the
presence of high correlation between the short-term rates at maturities associated with the target horizon (1 year) prevents this from
being a problem.
12We assume that t is identically and independently distributed.
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3.1. Data
The Canadian data cover the monthly sample over the period 1996:1 to 2006:12. The data sources are the web page
of the Bank of Canada (http://www.bankofcanada.ca), the online version of the International Financial Statistics
(IFS), and the Energy Information Administration.
Data downloaded from the web page of the Bank of Canada: The rst log di¤erence of monthly CPI has been used
for Canadian ination. Overnight interest rate has been used as Canadian policy (i.e., short-term interest) rate.
Canadian-dollar e¤ective exchange rate index (CERI) has been used for Canadian e¤ective terms of trade. As an
instrument in the GMM estimation, M1+ (gross) has been used for Canadian M1. The ination target has been
set to the midpoint of the target range, which is equal to 2.
Data downloaded from online IFS: Industrial production series (IPS) has been used for Canadian output. The
output gap has been found by detrending Canadian IPS by using HodrickPrescott (HP) lter. We use the denition
of Khalaf and Kichian (2004) for the measure of output gap. That is, rather than detrending the log of IPS using
the full sample, T, we proceed iteratively: to obtain the value of the gap at time t, we detrend IPS with the data
ending in T. We then extend the sample by one more observation and re-estimate the trend. This is used to detrend
IPS and yields a value for the gap at time t+1. This process is repeated until the end of the sample. For foreign
interest rate, government bond yield of the U.S. for 10 years has been used.
Data downloaded from Energy Information Administration: To get a measure of international trade costs, although
it is necessary to measure the wedge between the price of imported goods on the domestic market and their
price at the source measured in domestic currency units, as a proxy, we use "All Countries Spot Petroleum Price
FOB Weighted by Estimated Export Volume (International Dollars per Barrel)". This is the best available data
for trade costs to our knowledge. We have also considered using the Couriers and Messengers Services Price
Index downloaded from Statistics Canada as an alternative for trade costs. However, the data cover only the
period from 2003 to 2006, which is much shorter than our sample period. Nevertheless, from 2003 to 2006, the
correlation coe¢ cient between All Countries Spot Petroleum Price FOB Weighted by Estimated Export Volume
and Couriers and Messengers Services Price Indexis around 0.95, which can be seen as an indicator of robustness
of our analysis.
3.2. Estimation of the Monetary Policy Rule
Let zzt be a vector of variables, within the central banks information set at the time it chooses the interest rate
(i.e. zzt 2 
t) that are orthogonal to "t. Possible elements of zzt include any lagged variables that help to forecast
ination and output gap, as well as any contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the current interest
rate shock t. In sum, we have the following orthogonality condition:
Et [it   (1  i) fr +  +  [t+1   ] + xxtg   iit 1 jzzt ] = 0 (3.1)
In Equation (3.1), the expected signs of r; ; ; x are all positive. By using this orthogonality condition, we
use continuous updating GMM to estimate the parameter vector [r; ; ; x].
13 Since the econometric estimation
procedure that we use here (GMM) requires that all the variables (including instruments) used in the estimation
should be stationary, all of the variables are tested by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The null of
unit root is rejected in all variables, at least at the 10 percent signicance level, when tests are applied at di¤erent
13For continuous updating GMM estimators, we have modied the GAUSS code originally used by Stock and Wright (2000). All of
our codes are available upon request. Gauss version 6.0 has been used.
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lags.14 The results are illustrated in Table 1. The instruments used for GMM estimation consist of twelve lags of
home ination (calculated according to Equation (2.14)), percentage change in M1 and three lags of output gap.15
Table 1 reports the estimates of r, , x and i. All of the estimates satisfy their expected signs.
16 In particular,
the estimate of the coe¢ cient on the di¤erence between expected and targeted ination is around 5.50 for Canada.
That is, if expected ination were 1 percentage point above the target, the Bank of Canada would set the interest
rate approximately 5.50 percent above its equilibrium value. This coe¢ cient is signicant at the 10% level when
we use asymptotic normality as an approximation to the sampling distribution of GMM estimators.
The response of the Bank of Canada to the deviations of the expected output gap from its target (assumed to
be zero) is around 0.09. In other words, holding other parameters constant, one unit increase in output gap induces
the Bank of Canada to increase the interest rates by 9 basis points. This coe¢ cient is again signicant at the 10%
level. The equilibrium real interest rate is estimated as 1.37 percent and it is signicant at the 10% level using
normal asymptotics. The estimation results also indicate that the smoothing parameter is highly signicant and
equal to 0.96. This estimate implies that the Bank of Canada puts forth signicant e¤ort to smooth interest rates.
Table 2 illustrates the test statistics for GMM estimation. The Hansens J -statistic does not reject the null
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are satised at conventional signicance levels.
Despite their signicance, one should be wary about GMM-based results that are obtained under the asymp-
totic normality of the sampling distributions obtained under conventional asymptotics. Under weak-identication
asymptotics, the sampling distributions are quite far from being normally distributed. In this paper, we address
the problem of weak identication by using two di¤erent tests. The rst of these tests is the Anderson and Roubin
(1949) test (AR-test) in its general form presented by Kleibergen (2002). The second test is the K -test developed by
Kleibergen (2002). These two tests are robust in the case of nonlinear models (see Stock et al., 2002; Dufour, 2003;
Dufour and Taamouti, 2005, 2006), and perhaps more importantly, they are robust even to excluded instruments
(see Dufour, 2003). Since it is rarely possible to use all possible instruments, this latter property is quite important
from an applied point of view (see Yazgan and Yilmazkuday, 2005).
AR and K -test statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that:
H0 : r = 1:37; = 5:50;x = 0:09; i = 0:96
i.e., given the instruments that we used, whether the estimated parameters are compatible with the data or not.17
Since both of these tests are fully robust to weak instruments (see Stock et al., 2002, pp.522), a non-rejection of
this null hypothesis means that our estimates are also data-admissibleeven under the case of weak instruments.
As is evident from Table 2, given the high p-value of the AR-test, our parameter estimates cannot be rejected.18
In other words, our GMM estimates of the Bank of Canadas monetary policy cannot be refuted by the Canadian
data.
However, as argued by Kleibergen (2002), the deciency of the AR-statistic is that its limiting distribution
has a degree of freedom parameter equal to the number of instruments. Therefore the AR-statistic su¤ers from
the problem of low power when the number of instruments highly exceeds the number of parameters. Kleibergen
proposed a statistic (K -statistic) that remedies the drawback of the AR-statistic. Kleibergen, unlike the AR-
14These results are available upon request.
15By choosing these instruments, we implicitly assume that these variables are strong instruments for predicting ination and output
gap.
16Although the comparison of these estimates with the existing literature is absurd due to the di¤erences in model specications and
sample periods, see Ambler et al. (2004), Murchison et al. (2004), Cayen et al. (2006), Ortega and Rebei (2006), Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) for other monetary policy rule estimations of the Bank of Canada.
17As suggested by Kleibergen (2002), the AR-test and the K-test statistics are calculated by interpreting all data matrices in the test
as residuals from the projection on exogenous variables.
18The AR-statistics, under the above null hypothesis, has an exact Fisher distribution with k and T-k degrees of freedom (where k
is the number of instruments, and T is the number of observations), given that the error terms are i.i.d. normal, and the instruments
are strictly exogenous. kAR statistics are asymptotically distributed chi-square with k degrees of freedom even without i.i.d. normal
errors under standard regularity conditions (see Dufour and Jasiak, 2001, pp. 829, and Dufour 2003, pp.20).
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test, does not provide a nite sample theory, but instead shows that his K -statistic follows an asymptotic 2(G)
distribution (where G is the number of endogenous regressors) under the null hypothesis in the absence of exogenous
regressors. As can be seen from Table 2, our K -statistics provides a similar result to the AR-test.
3.3. Estimation of the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
We continue with the structural estimation of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve dened by Equation (2.49) where
the expected signs of  and  are both positive. Exactly the same methodology used for the estimation of the
monetary policy rule is also employed here. The estimation results are illustrated in Table 3. The instruments used
for the GMM estimation consist of six lags of home ination (calculated according to Equation (2.14)), six lags of
the percentage change in terms of trade, and two lags of percentage change in M1. As is evident, both estimates
satisfy their expected signs.
Although the comparison of these estimates with the existing literature is absurd due to the di¤erences in model
specications and sample periods, see Ambler et al. (2004), Murchison et al. (2004), Dufour et al. (2006), Lubik
and Schorfheide (2007) for recent New-Keynesian Phillips curve estimations of the Canadian economy. Finally,
both AR-and K -statistics in Table 4 support our estimation results for the Phillips curve.
3.4. Remaining Parameters
The serial correlation parameters for productivity, international trade costs and foreign interest rate are estimated
as (z;  ; i) = (0:98; 0:97; 0:99) by using the relevant AR(1) processes given in the text. Moreover, the related
standard deviations, which are used to determine the size of the shocks in the simulations next section, are similarly
estimated as (z; ;i) = (0:01; 0:09; 0:17). The share of domestic consumption allocated to imported goods is
set to  = 0:36, which is (implied by Equation (2.8) as) the mean ratio of the value of imports to the value of GDP
over the sample period. Finally, the gross markup is set equal to  = 1:35, which is equal to the average markup
in the manufacturing sector in Canada (data obtained from Statistics Canada), and thus, it is implied that price
elasticity of demand faced by each monopolist is set as  = 3:85.
4. Results and Comparisons
In order to compare the expected loss implications of alternative monetary policy rules, a criterion is needed. Two
alternative approaches that are highly accepted in the literature are considered: (i) utility-based loss function, (ii)
ad hoc loss function. While the utility-based loss function is obtained through the micro-foundations of the model,
the ad hoc loss function is assumed to depend on the volatility in ination, the output gap, and the interest rate.
4.1. Utility-Based Loss Function
The period specic utility from consumption, U (Ct), and disutility from working, V (Nt), can be second-order
approximated around their steady states as follows:
U (Ct) = ct + t:i:p:+ o
 a3 (4.1)
and
V (Nt) = nt +
1
2
n2t + t:i:p:+ o
 a3 (4.2)
where t.i.p. represents terms independent of policy and o
 a3 represents terms that are higher than 3rd order.
The steady state relation VN (N)N = UC (C)C together with the assumptions of U(C) = logC and V (N) = N
have been used to obtain Equations (4.1) and (4.2). Using Equation (2.39), its symmetric version for the rest of the
world, st+st  2 t, log version of Equation (2.21), and Equation (2.23), the following expression for ct is obtained:
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ct = (1  )yt + yt + (1  ) t (4.3)
Dening ~ct = ct   ct as the deviation of (log) consumption from its exible pricing equilibrium, it can be written
that:
ct = (1  )xt + (1  )yt + yt + (1  ) t (4.4)
which can be inserted into Equation (4.1). Related to Equation (4.2), after dening ~nt = nt   nt as the deviation
of (log) employment from its exible pricing equilibrium, using the log version of Equation (2.31), one can write:
nt = xt + at + yt   zt (4.5)
where at = log
R 1
0
Yt(j)
Yt
dj

= log
R 1
0
PH;t(j)
PH;t
dj

by using Equation (2.38) and we have used at = 0 which is implied
by the denition of exible pricing. Then, by using Equations (4.4) and (4.5), it can be written that:
U (Ct)  V (Nt) =  

xt + at +
1
2
(xt + at + yt   zt)2

+ t:i:p: (4.6)
The following lemmas are helpful for our analysis.
Lemma 1. at = 2vari (pH;t (i)) + o
 a3.
Proof: See Gali and Monacelli (2005), p.732.
Lemma 2.
P1
t=0 
tvari (pH;t (i)) =
1
w
P1
t=0 
t2H;t where w =
(1 )(1 )
 .
Proof: See Woodford (2003), Chapter 6.
According to our lemmas and Equations (2.27), (2.51), (2.56), (4.6), we can write the utility-based welfare
function as follows:
Et
P1
k=0 
t+k (U (Ct+k)  V (Nt+k)) = Et
P1
k=0 
t+k (log  +  t+k   ) st+k (4.7)
where w =
(1 )(1 )
 ;   =(   1) is a markup as a result of market power;  > 1 is the price elasticity of
demand faced by each monopolist; st is the (log) e¤ective terms of trade;  is the share of domestic consumption
allocated to imported goods; t.i.p. represents terms independent of policy; and nally, o
 a3 represents terms
that are equal to or higher than 3rd order.
Note that the utility-based welfare function depends on the volatility in ination and output gap as well as
the international trade costs and the terms of trade. It is derived explicitly as a quadratic approximation to the
utility function of the representative household. However, the welfare comparisons below are made on the basis of
a linearized model. We know on the results of Kim and Kim (2003) that this can be misleading, because linear
approximate methods fail to take into account the impact of uncertainty (stochastic shocks) on the expected values
of the endogenous variables. In order to remedy this problem, following Erceg et al. (2000), recall that we have
introduced taxes and subsidies into the model such that the steady state of the economy is Pareto optimum (see
Equations (2.16) and (2.29)).
The utility-based loss function implied by Equation (4.7) is as follows:
Et
1X
k=0
t+kLubt+k = Et
1X
k=0
t+k
 
 (1  log     t+k) (H;t+k)2
2w
+
(xt+k)
2
2
  (log  +  t+k   ) st+k
!
(4.8)
The estimated policy function is evaluated relative to the optimal policy as follows:
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Exercise 1 Since a typical central bank determines its policy considering the dynamics of the economy (i.e., the
IS curve and the New Keynesian Phillips curve), given these dynamics, following the lead of Ambler et al.
(2004), Cayen et al. (2006), Murchison and Rennison (2006), and Ortega and Rebei (2006), we search for the
optimized monetary policy rules under possible types of shocks. In particular, we use the method of stochastic
simulations to determine the vector of parameters that minimizes the expected loss function; i.e., for each
possible combination of i, , and x values in Equation (2.63), we calculate the expected loss value by
Equation (4.8).
Exercise 2. We compare the performance of the estimated monetary policy rule of the Bank of Canada with
the optimized monetary policy rule (obtained by Exercise 1) in terms of expected loss in the economy (i.e.,
Equation (4.8)).
In both exercises, a combination of three possible types of shocks, namely a trade cost shock, a technology shock,
a foreign interest rate shock are considred. These shocks are determined by Equations (2.11), (2.27) and (2.33).
The sizes of the shocks are set equal to one standard deviation of the relevant shock variables as described in the
data section, above.19 In other words, we compute the standard deviation of the observed shocks and use them in
the simulation.
The results of both exercises are given in Table 5 which compares optimal monetary policy rules and historical
(i.e., estimated) monetary policy rules. Note that we have considered the cases of with and without international
trade costs to show their relative implications. While the case with international trade costs refers to the unrestricted
version of our model, the case without international trade costs refers to the restricted version of our model in which
international trade costs are ignored (i.e.,  t = 0 for all t). In both cases, optimal  and x values are much higher
than the estimates of historical monetary policy rule of the Bank of Canada. Nevertheless, i values are very close
to each other. In other words, given the utility-based welfare function, the Bank of Canada places much lower
weight upon ination and output than the optimal monetary policy, while it gives approximately the same weight
to smoothing the interest rate.
When the welfare loss values calculated by Equation (4.8) are compared, the historical monetary policy rule is
far from optimal. Moreover, when the discounted (lifetime) value of the deviation of consumption between optimal
and historical monetary policy rules are compared, the consumption implied by the historical rule deviates around
50% from the one implied by the optimal rule, in the case with international trade costs. This deviation increases
to around 90% in the case without international trade costs. This brings another possibility into the picture: What
if the Bank of Canada has its own expected loss function rather than the utility-based loss function? We consider
this possibility in the following subsection by considering an ad hoc loss function.
4.2. Ad Hoc Loss Function
Similar to Svensson (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), Woodford (1999),
Batini and Nelson (2001), Smets (2003), the ad hoc intertemporal loss function is assumed to depend on the
deviations of ination and output from their steady state values, and the volatility of the policy instrument. It can
be demonstrated as follows:
Et
1X
k=0
kLaht+k (4.9)
where  is the discount factor of the central bank (which can be di¤erent from the consumer discount factor, ),
and the period loss function, following Smets (2003), is given by:
Laht =  
 
H;t
2
+ (1   )

 x (xt)
2
+ (1   x) (it)2

(4.10)
19MATLAB version 7.1.0.246 R(14) Service Pack 3 has been used for the simulation. The codes are available upon request.
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where 0     1 and 0   x  1. While the inclusion of ination and output into the loss function is almost
standard, as Cayen et al. (2006) point out, the policy instrument may enter as an argument of the loss function for
three di¤erent reasons: (i) big and unexpected changes to interest rates may cause problems for nancial stability
(Cukierman 1990; Smets 2003), (ii) the policy-makers may be concerned about hitting the lower nominal bound
on interest rates (Rotemberg and Woodford 1997; Woodford 1999; Smets 2003), or (iii) in reality, the monetary
authority (and other agents) may be uncertain about the nature and the persistence of the shocks at play in the
economy at the time it must make a decision about its policy instrument.
Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), we consider the limiting case of the central bank discount factor
satisfying  = 1 in order to interpret the intertemporal loss function as the unconditional mean of the period loss
function, which is equal to the sum of the unconditional variances of the goal variables:
E

Laht

=  V ar

H;t

+ (1   ) ( xV ar [xt] + (1   x)V ar [it]) (4.11)
Instead of assuming specic values as in the related empirical literature (see Batini and Nelson, 2001; Rudebusch
and Svensson, 1998; Cayen et al., 2006), di¤erent possible values for   and  x are considered in the analysis. In
particular, the following exercises are employed:
Exercise 1. By considering all possible values for   and  x, we analyze the performance of our estimated model
(i.e., by using the estimated parameters of the New Keynesian Phillips curve and monetary policy rule) in
terms of the expected loss function, after possible types of shocks.
Exercise 2. Since a typical central bank determines its policy considering the dynamics of the economy (i.e., the
IS curve and the New Keynesian Phillips curve), given these dynamics, following the lead of Ambler et al.
(2004), Cayen et al. (2006), Murchison and Rennison (2006), and Ortega and Rebei (2006), we search for the
optimized monetary policy rules under possible types of shocks, again by considering all possible values for
  and  x.
Exercise 3. By considering the expected loss functions calculated by Exercise 1 and Exercise 2, we compare the
performance of the estimated monetary policy rule of the Bank of Canada with the optimized monetary
policy rule in terms of expected loss in the economy. By this comparison, we search for the weights assigned
to ination, output and interest rate volatilities in the loss function at which the Bank of Canada is most
successful. We follow an optimistic approach and accept these calculated weights as the Bank of Canadas
policy weights.
In all exercises, three possible types of shocks, namely a negative foreign interest rate shock, a negative trade
cost shock and a positive technology shock, are considered. The sizes of the shocks are again set equal to one
standard deviation of the relevant shock variables as described in the data section.
4.2.1. Exercise 1
This subsection calculates the expected loss function given by Equation (4.11) considering the estimated model
parameters in Section III (i.e., the estimated parameters of the New Keynesian Phillips curve and monetary policy
rule) together with all possible   and  x values. We also consider two cases: one with trade cost, the other
without international trade costs. The results are given in Figure 1 and Figure 2. As is evident, roughly speaking,
the expected loss function decreases in   and increases in  x for Figure 1, while it is slightly di¤erent for Figure
2. The intuition behind this result will be clearer by the following exercises.
4.2.2. Exercise 2
This subsection searches for the optimized monetary policy rules (MPRs) with and without international trade
costs. As before, following the lead of Cayen et al. (2006), and Murchison and Rennison (2006), we use the method
17
of stochastic simulations to determine the vector of parameters that minimizes the expected loss function. In
particular, for each possible combination of i, , x and s values in Equation (2.63), we calculate the variance
of ination, the output gap, and the change in the level of the interest rate to nd the minimized expected loss,
after simultaneous shocks of technology, trade cost and foreign interest rate. Again, all possible ( ;  x) pairs are
considered in the analysis. The grid search in the existence of international trade costs results in the expected loss
values in Figure 3 which are computed through Equation (2.63) by using the calculated optimal monetary policy
coe¢ cients given in Figures 4-6.
As is evident from Figure 3, the expected loss function under optimal policy rules increases in  x while it takes
its lowest value when we move toward   = 1. When the optimal monetary policy rules under possible ( ;  x)
pairs in Figures 4-6 are considered, the optimal , x and i take higher values when   decreases.
When the same analysis is repeated in the absence of international trade costs, the e¤ects of the inclusion of
international trade costs become clearer. The results are given in Figures 7-10.
Figures 3-10 show that the loss function specication of the central bank (i.e., the ( ;  x) values) together with
the inclusion of international trade costs plays a big role in the determination of optimized MPRs. This information
is used to compare the performance of estimated MPR with the optimized MPRs in the following exercise.
4.2.3. Exercise 3
By considering the expected loss functions calculated by Exercise 1 and Exercise 2, this subsection compares the
performance of the estimated (historical) monetary policy rule of the Bank of Canada with the performance of the
optimized monetary policy rule in terms of expected loss in the economy, under all possible ( ;  x) pairs together
with considering the e¤ect of international trade costs. By this comparison, we search for the weights assigned to
ination, output and interest rate volatilities in the loss function by which the actions of the Bank of Canada are
explained best.
In particular, three di¤erent cases are considered:
Case 1. The presence of international trade costs, i.e., the unrestricted version of our model.
Case 2. The absence of international trade costs, i.e., the restricted version of our model in which  t = 0 for all t.
Case 3. The hybrid case in which international trade costs exist, but the Bank of Canada ignores them.
For Case 1, the expected loss values in Figure 1 and Figure 3 are compared. This comparison is achieved by
calculating the percentage deviation of the expected loss under estimated monetary policy from the one under
optimal monetary policy. The results are given in Figure 11. As is evident from Figure 11, the percentage deviation
takes lower values towards ( ;  x) = (0:9; 0:7) at which it reaches its minimum. According to these values, for
Case 1, it follows that the Bank of Canada assigns 90% of weight to ination, 7% of weight to output gap and 3%
weight to interest rate in the loss function.
According to the calculated weights, the optimal MPR for Case 1 is implied as follows:
o = 2:2;
o
x = 0:08; 
o
i = 0:57
Compared to the estimated/historical MPR in Table 1, the optimal o = 2:2 and 
o
i = 0:57 values are lower while
the optimal ox = 0:08; value is almost the same.
For Case 2, the expected loss values in Figure 2 and Figure 7 are compared. This comparison is again achieved
by calculating the percentage deviation of the expected loss under the estimated monetary policy from the one
under optimal monetary policy. The results are given in Figure 12. As is evident from Figure 12, the percentage
deviation takes lower values toward ( ;  x) = (0:1; 0:1) at which it reaches its minimum. According to these
values, for Case 2, it is implied that the Bank of Canada assigns 10% of weight to ination, 9% of weight to output
gap and 81% weight to interest rate in the loss function.
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According to the calculated weights, the optimal MPR for Case 2 is implied as follows:
o = 0:9;
o
x = 0:27; 
o
i = 0:85
Compared to the estimated/historical MPR in Table 1, the optimal o = 0:9 and 
o
i = 0:85 values are lower while
the optimal ox = 0:27; is higher.
For Case 3, the expected loss values in Figure 2 and Figure 3 are compared. This comparison is again achieved
by calculating the percentage deviation of the expected loss under the estimated monetary policy from the one
under optimal monetary policy. The results are given in Figure 13.
As is evident from Figure 13, the percentage deviation takes lower values toward ( ;  x) = (0:7; 0:5) at which
it reaches its minimum. According to these values, for Case 3, it is implied that the Bank of Canada assigns 70%
of weight to ination, 15% of weight to output gap and 15% weight to interest rate in the loss function.
According to the calculated weights, the optimal MPR for Case 3 is implied as follows:
o = 2:2;
o
x = 0:08; 
o
i = 0:57
which is the same as in Case 1.
Now, a criterion is needed to evaluate which case is more likely to represent the actions of the Bank of Canada.
This is achieved by considering the percentage deviation of the historical monetary policy rule from the optimal
monetary policy rule in terms of expected loss values for each case. The results are given in Table 6. As is evident,
the minimum percentage deviation is achieved by the Hybrid Case, which suggests that the actions of the Bank of
Canada are explained best when international trade costs in fact exist but the Bank of Canada ignores them. 20
4.3. Impulse Response Functions
This subsection compares the impulse response functions under the estimated (historical) monetary policy with the
ones under optimal monetary policy (both utility-based and ad hoc), after possible types of shocks. We consider
the cases with international trade costs in the analysis. The results under simultaneous shocks of technology,
international trade costs, and foreign interest rate are given in Figures 14-17. Simultaneous shocks are considered
rather than individual shocks, because, according to the data, they are the possible shocks that the economy can
experience in a typical period.
Figure 14 compares the response of output gap to three simultaneous shocks under estimated and optimal
MPRs. As is evident, the volatility in output gap is best controlled under estimated MPR, while it is highest under
optimized MPR found by the ad hoc expected loss function. Nevertheless, it is the opposite case for ination when
we consider Figure 15: the volatility in ination is best controlled under optimized MPR found by the ad hoc
expected loss function, while it is highest under estimated MPR. Similar comparisons can be made in Figures 16
and 17.
5. Conclusion
An open economy DSGE model has been introduced to analyze the e¤ects of international trade costs on the actual
central bank behaviour. The log-linearized model is expressed in terms of four blocks of equations: aggregate
demand (i.e., the IS curve), aggregate supply (i.e., the New-Keynesian Phillips curve), monetary policy rule, and
stochastic processes. For model parametrization, the New-Keynesian Phillips curve for the Canadian economy,
together with the monetary policy rule of the Bank of Canada, has been estimated.
20When we compare the discounted (lifetime) value of the deviation of consumption between optimal and historical monetary policy
rules, we see that the consumption implied by the historical rule deviates around 101% from the one implied by the optimal rule, in the
presence of trade costs. The deviation is around 118% in the absence of trade costs. In the Hybrid Case, the deviation is calculated as
99%.
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By considering the dynamics of the Canadian economy (i.e., the New-Keynesian Phillips curve and the IS curve),
optimal monetary policy rules under di¤erent scenarios have been calculated and compared with the estimated
monetary policy rule to evaluate the performance of the Bank of Canada. When a utility-based expected loss
function is considered, it is found that the actions of the Bank of Canada are far from being optimal. When an
ad hoc expected loss function based on ination, output and interest volatilities is considered, it is found that the
actions of the Bank of Canada are best explained by a model in which international trade costs actually exist in the
economy but the Bank of Canada ignores them. Finally, we nd that the Bank of Canada assigns 70% of weight to
ination, 15% of weight to interest rate and 15% of weight to output in its ad hoc loss function.
Many things remain to be done, in terms of either modeling or empirical analysis: what if international trade
costs a¤ect both nal good and intermediate input prices; what is the relation between capital (utilization) and
international trade costs (and/or oil prices); is there any di¤erence in terms of the trade cost e¤ects between the
monetary policy of developing and developed countries (e.g., small versus large economies)? These are possible
topics of future research.
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Table 1 - GMM Estimates of the Monetary Policy Rule
r  x i
1.37 5.50 0.09 0.96
(0.8441) (4.1913) (0.0616) (0.0258)
[0.0523] [0.0946] [0.0835] [0.0000]
Notes: Standard errors calculated using the Delta method are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets. The sample size is
114 after considering data availability and instruments used which consist of twelve lags of home ination, percentage change
in M1 and three lags of output gap.
Table 2 - Test Statistics for GMM Estimation of the Monetary Policy Rule
AR stat K stat J stat Adjusted R2
F (27; 87) 2 (27) 2 (2) 2 (25)
0.74 19.87 2.39 15.53 0:99
[0.82] [0.84] [0.30] [0.93]
Notes: P-values are in brackets.
Table 3 - GMM Estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
   m
0.99 0.99 1.09 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets. The sample size is 127 after considering data
availability and instruments used, which consist of six lags of home ination, six lags of the percentage change in terms of
trade and two lags of percentage change in M1. The standard errors of  and m have been calculated by using the Delta
method.
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Table 4 - Statistics for GMM Estimation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
AR stat K stat J stat Adjusted R2
F (14; 113) 2 (14) 2 (2) 2 (13)
0.65 9.03 0.05 11.99 0:86
[0.82] [0.83] [0.98] [0.53]
Notes: P-values are in brackets.
Table 5 - Optimal vs. Historical Monetary Policy Rule
 x i Welfare Loss
Optimal MPR with Trade Costs 18.5 0.37 0.97 1:11 10 5
Optimal MPR without Trade Costs 13.0 0.36 0.95 2:29 10 5
Historical MPR with Trade Costs 5.5 0.09 0.96 12.76
Historical MPR without Trade Costs 5.5 0.09 0.96 13.65
Table 6 - Expected Loss Values
Monetary Policy Rule Percentage
Case Estimated MPR Optimized MPR Deviation
Presence of Trade Costs 3:77 10 6 3:44 10 6 9%
Absence of Trade Costs 1:60 10 6 2:34 10 8 422%
Hybrid Case 4:40 10 6 4:40 10 6 0%
Notes: MPR stands for Monetary Policy Rule. Percentage deviation is dened as 100 times the log di¤erence between the
expected loss functions under estimated MPR and optimized MPR.
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Figure 1 - Expected Loss Values for Historical MPR in the presence of Trade Costs
Figure 2 - Expected Loss Values for Historical MPR in the absence of Trade Costs
Figure 3 - Expected Loss Values for Optimal MPR in the presence of Trade Costs
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Figure 4 - Optimal Coe¢ cient of Ination in the presence of Trade Costs
Figure 5 - Optimal Coe¢ cient of Output in the presence of Trade Costs
Figure 6 - Optimal Coe¢ cient of Interest Rate in the presence of Trade Costs
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Figure 7 - Expected Loss Values for Optimal MPR in the absence of Trade Costs
Figure 8 - Optimal Coe¢ cient of Ination in the absence of Trade Costs
Figure 9 - Optimal Coe¢ cient of Output in the absence of Trade Costs
30
Figure 10 - Optimal Coe¢ cient of Interest Rate in the presence of Trade Costs
Figure 11 - Percentage Deviation from Optimal Expected Loss in the Presence of Trade Costs
Figure 12 - Percentage Deviation from Optimal Expected Loss in the Absence ofTrade Costs
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Figure 13 - Percentage Deviation from Optimal Expected Loss for the Hybrid Case
Figure 14 - Response of Output Gap
Figure 15 - Response of Ination
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Figure 16 - Response of Nominal Interest
Figure 17 - Response of Real Exchange Rate
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6. Appendix - Model Solution
The dynamic system is given by the main Equations (2.14), (2.26), (2.58), (2.63), (2.57), by the exogenous shock
Equations (2.11), (2.27), (2.33), by the denition of domestic ination H;t = pH;t   pH;t 1 and by the denition
of output gap xt = yt   yt and Equation (2.54). For simplicity, after substituting xt = yt   yt and Equation (2.54)
into Equations (2.58), (2.63), (2.57) and after substituting Equation (2.14) into Equation (2.63), we can rewrite the
equations used in the solution of the model as follows:
yt +  t   Et (yt+1 +  t+1) +
 
it   Et
 
H;t+1

= 0 (6.1)
H;t   Et [H;t+1]  m (yt   zt +  t) = 0 (6.2)
st   it +
 
it   Et

H;t+1
  Et st+1    t+1 +  t = 0 (6.3)
it   iit 1   (1  i)

Et
 
H;t+1
  (1  i)x [Et (yt   zt +  t)]
  (1  i) [Et (st+1   st)] = 0
(6.4)
H;t   pH;t + pH;t 1 = 0 (6.5)
it = ii

t 1 + "
i
t (6.6)
 t =  t 1 + "

t (6.7)
zt = zzt 1 + "
z
t (6.8)
where we have set all the constants equal to zero.21 Following the lead of Uhlig (1997), the vector of endogenous
state variables is xt =
h
it pH;t yt st
i0
, the single vector of non-predetermined variable (jump variable) is
yt =

H;t

and the vector of shock variables is zt =
h
it  t zt
i0
. The model in matrix form is thus:
Axt +Bxt 1 + Cyt +Dzt = 0
Et [Fxt+1 +Gxt +Hxt 1 + Jyt+1 +Kyt + Lzt+1 +Mzt] = 0
zt+1 = Nzt + "t+1
(6.9)
In our case, we will rewrite Equation (6.5) in matrix form as follows:
Axt +Bxt 1 + Cyt +Dzt = 0 (6.10)
where A =
h
0 1 0 0
i
, B =
h
0  1 0 0
i
, C = [1], and D =
h
0 0 0 0
i
.
We can write Equations, (6.1),(6.2), (6.3) and (6.4) in matrix form as follows:
Et [Fxt+1 +Gxt +Hxt 1 + Jyt+1 +Kyt + Lzt+1 +Mzt] = 0 (6.11)
where
21Setting all constants equal to zero doesnt a¤ect our results at all
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F =
26664
0 0  1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0  1
0 0 0   (1  i)
37775 ; G =
26664
1 0 0 0
0 0  m 0
1 0 0 1
1 0   (1  i)x  (1  i)
37775 ;
H =
26664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 i 0 0 0
37775 ; J =
26664
 1
 
 1
  (1  i)
37775 ; K =
26664
0
1
0
0
37775 ;
L =
26664
0  1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
37775 ; M =
26664
0 1 0 0
0  m m 0
 1  1 0 0
0   (1  i)x (1  i)x 0
37775 :
Finally, we can rewrite Equations (6.6), (6.7) and (6.8) in matrix form as follows:
zt+1 = Nzt + "t+1 (6.12)
where
N =
264 i 0 00  0
0 0 z
375 ; "t+1 =
264 "i

t+1
"t+1
"zt+1
375
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